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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Jackson once mused that "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances."' While this may have been true at the time, when the primary
concern of a criminal defendant was the right to a fair trial,2 the evolution of plea
809
1. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2. The Supreme Court first held that plea bargaining is constitutional in 1970. See Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970). See generally Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea-
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bargaining has radically altered the calculus of when to allow a criminal
defendant to talk to the prosecution. Though there are no exact figures for how
many cases are resolved through plea bargaining, current estimates of both state
and federal cases hover between 90 and 95%.3 Prosecutors and defense counsel
have adapted to this changing landscape and each continues to use plea-
bargaining rules and procedures in order to gain an advantage over the other.4
One such tool-proffer agreements-requires careful study to understand its
uses and dangers.
In recent years, proffer statements and agreements have caused particular
controversy. Prosecutors routinely require criminal defendants to admit their
roles and knowledge of a crime through a proffer statement before the
6
prosecution will offer a plea agreement. While these statements are normally
inadmissible per Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, prosecutors
increasingly require criminal defendants to sign a proffer agreement waiving the
protection.8 If the defendant breaches the proffer agreement, the prosecutor will
then be allowed to admit the defendant's statements as evidence against the
defendant.9 While the United States Supreme Court has only ruled on waiver for
impeachment purposes,'0 the South Carolina Supreme Court and several federal
courts of appeals have gone further by allowing for total waiver, which allows a
prosecutor to admit a defendant's proffer statements in the prosecution's case-in-
chief" While total waiver may be a permanent, constitutional addition to plea-
Bargaining's Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 77-82
(providing a history of plea bargaining).
3. LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH
SUMMARY 1 (2011) (citing MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2002: STATISTICAL TABLES (2005); T.
FLANAGAN & K. MAGUIRE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 1989, at 492 tbl.5.17 (1990)).
4. See, e.g., David P. Leonard, Let's Negotiate a Deal: Waiver of Protections Against the
Use ofPlea Bargains and Plea Bargaining Statements After Mezzanatto, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at
8, 9-10 (describing how the Federal Rules of Evidence lead to conflicting prosecutorial and defense
strategies during plea bargaining).
5. See, e.g., Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., "Queen for A Day" or "Courtesan
for A Day ": The Sixth Amendment Limits to Proffer Agreements, WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP., Oct.
2001, at 1, 1 (noting the role of proffer agreements in the broader "conflict between .. , the notion
of trial as a truth-seeking device versus guarantees of procedural fairness").
6. See id.
7. See FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(4); S.C. R. EVID. 410(4).
8. See Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 5("Within the last few years ... prosecutors and other
agencies have insisted on broader waivers . . . .").
9. See, e.g., State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 188, 762 S.E.2d 3, 5 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting a proffer agreement as stating, "Violation of any term of this Proffer
renders all terms null and void; the State shall have the right to use any information obtained
through this Proffer in any fashion, whether direct [or] collateral to this matter.").
10. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 198, 201, 210 (1995); id. at 211
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
11. See United States v. Stevens, 455 F. App'x 343, 344-45, (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished per
curiam opinion) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1001-06 (10th Cir. 2011); United
810 [VOL. 66: 809
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bargaining procedures, it carries a high potential for abuse, which can cause
cascading, uncorrectable errors.
Proffer agreements, like plea agreements, exist in the nexus of contract and
criminal law.12 On the one hand, general contract principles guide proffer
agreements' drafting;13 on the other hand, controversies are adjudicated under
the rules and guise of criminal procedure.14  As a result, drafting proffer
agreements requires both knowledge of contract law and a precision that may be
unusual for criminal practitioners. Imprecise drafting may create controversy as
to how a court should construe the proffer agreement's terms. One need look no
further than the agreement at issue in State v. Wills'5 to see that drafting
problems can raise grave due process concerns.16
This Note argues that proffer agreements must be drafted with extreme
care-more than is apparent in the relevant case law-to prevent compounding
constitutional violations. Because proffer agreements operate with few
constitutional safeguards-fewer than criminal trials or even plea agreements-a
constitutional violation caused by a poorly drafted proffer agreement is difficult
to correct and will cause far-reaching issues for the criminal justice system. Part
II of this Note explains the purpose and background of proffer agreements,
including drafting issues that arose in the 2014 South Carolina Supreme Court
case State v. Wills. Part III provides and applies the general contract and
criminal procedure principles that govern proffer agreements. Lastly, Part IV
provides a model proffer agreement and thoughts about its proper use and
application.
States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 2009)); Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1006; Sylvester,
583 F.3d at 289 (citing Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 203-04); United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905,
911 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Wills, 409 S.C.
at 185, 762 S.E.2d at 4.
12. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) ("In the process of
determining whether disputed plea agreements have been formed or performed, courts have
necessarily drawn on the most relevant body of developed rules and principles of private law, those
pertaining to the formation and interpretation of commercial contracts."); State v. Compton, 366
S.C. 671, 677, 623 S.E.2d 661, 664 (2005) ("It is generally recognized that immunity agreements
and plea agreements are to be construed in accordance with general contract principles.").
13. See, e.g., Wills, 409 S.C. at 191-92, 762 S.E.2d at 7 (Beatty, J., dissenting) ("Using
principles of contract law as a guide, it is necessary to consider the effect of a breach of the proffer
agreement and decide the resultant remedy, i.e., the extent to which the State may utilize statements
made by a defendant pursuant to a proffer agreement.").
14. See Harvey, 791 F.2d at 300 ("[B]oth constitutional and supervisory concerns require
holding the Government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant (or possibly than
would be either of the parties to commercial contracts) for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements.").
15. 409 S.C. 183, 762 S.E.2d 3 (2014).
16. See id. at 204, 762 S.E.2d at 14 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at
217 (Souter, J., dissenting)); ef Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 5 (noting the disparate bargaining
power of the government and criminal defendants).
2015] 8 11
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II. THE USES AND PROBLEMATIC HISTORY OF INTERPRETING PROFFER
AGREEMENTS
A. The Evolution of Proffer Agreements and Waiver
Proffer agreements, sometimes called "queen for a day" agreements, are a
common tool of negotiating in the plea-bargaining process.'7  A proffer
agreement is "an agreement between a defendant and the government in a
criminal case that sets forth the terms under which the defendant will provide
information to the government during an interview, commonly referred to as a
'proffer session.""8 Proffer agreements define parties' rights and obligations,19
such as the prosecution's ability to use the defendant's statements or the
20defendant's obligation to be truthful. While proffer agreements may be used to
protect the defendant's rights,2' the prosecution may also use them to gain an
22advantage during plea bargaining.
Proffer agreements typically contain a waiver clause because of Rule 410 of
23the both the Federal and South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 410 of the
South Carolina Rules of Evidence makes inadmissible "any statement made in
the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority
which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later
withdrawn."24 The South Carolina Rules of Evidence parallel the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Although the drafters of Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
25may have intended for the rule to be a permanent fixture of criminal procedure,
the United States Supreme Court held, in the landmark case United States v.
17. Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 5.
18. 1 STEPHEN E. ARTHUR & ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK: CRIMINAL §
31:3 (4th ed. 2014), available at Westlaw FEDTRHB-CRIM.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Wills, 409 S.C. at 187-88, 762 S.E.2d at 5 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting the
proffer agreement at issue in the case).
21. ARTHUR & HUNTER, supra note 18 ("[Proffer agreements are] intended to
protect ... defendant[s] against the use of [their] statements, particularly in those situations in
which ... defendant[s] ha[ve] revealed incriminating information and the proffer session does not
mature into a plea agreement or other form of cooperation agreement.").
22. See Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 5 (noting that proffer agreements effectively preclude
a defendant from raising any defenses inconsistent with the defendant's proffer statements).
23. See FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(4); S.C. R. EVID. 410(4).
24. S.C. R. EvID. 410(4); accord FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(4).
25. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 214 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("Congress must have understood that the judicial system's interest in candid plea discussions would
be threatened by recognizing waivers under Rule[] 410. . .. "); see also 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-3.4 cmt. at 14-90 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that a rule contrary to Rule 410
"would discourage plea negotiations and agreements, for defendants would have to be constantly
concerned whether, in light of their plea negotiation activities, they could successfully defend on the
merits if a plea ultimately was not entered"). Rule 410 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence is
modeled on the federal rule. See 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 23:4 (7th ed. 2014), available at Westlaw JONESEVID.
812 [VOL. 66: 809
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Mezzanatto,26 that parties could agree to waive the rule's protections. The
Court reasoned that "[a]bsent some 'overriding procedural consideration that
prevents enforcement of the contract,"' an agreement o waive a rule of evidence
28is sufficient to allow waiver. Similarly, the Court held that because Congress
did not make any provision forbidding waiver, it intended to allow waiver, just
as rules of criminal procedure may be waived.29  However, the waiver in
Mezzanatto was only a partial one, allowing the prosecution to use proffer
statements for impeachment purposes.30 Therefore, the Court did not address
whether total waiver, which allows the prosecution to use a proffer statement in
its case-in-chief, was allowed.31 However, the Court cryptically stated that
"[t]here may be some evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental to the
reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be waived without
irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts."' 32  Whether this statement was
intended to mean that the Court did not believe total waiver was constitutional or
to warn against brash action by the lower courts, it slowed the total waiver's
advance, if only temporarily.33
Subsequently, many states have followed the holding in Mezzanatto and
allow defendants to waive Rule 410 for impeachment purposes.34  However,
several courts, including the South Carolina Supreme Court and five federal
26. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
27. Id. at 210.
28. Id. at 202 (quoting 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 207-08 (1977)).
29. Id. at 201. Only where specific language indicates Congress's intent to prevent or limit
waiver will the courts not find a presumption of waivability. Id.; cf Crosby v. United States, 506
U.S. 255, 258-59 (1993) (concluding that specific language stating when criminal defendants can
waive their right to be present at trial under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
precluded waiver under other circumstances); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959)
(concluding that Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only allows a defendant to
waive grand jury indictment in certain circumstances). The presumption of waivability has also
been applied to rules of evidence. Cf Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 138, 139 (1932) (noting the importance of "[c]ontracts to alter or 'waive' rules of evidence").
30. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 204 (majority opinion) (alteration in original).
33. The first total waiver case was decided in 1998. See United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d
1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
34. The following states allow at least partial waiver of Rule 410 protections for
impeachment purposes: Ohio, Minnesota, and California. See State v. Bethel, 854 N.E.2d 150, 168
(Ohio 2006) (quoting State v. Keene, 693 N.E.2d 246, 257 (Ohio 1998)); State v. Blom, 682
N.W.2d 578, 620 (Minn. 2004); People v. Crow, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 631 (Ct. App. 1994). Arizona
and Michigan allow for total waiver of Rule 410's protections. See State v. Campoy, 207 P.3d 792,
803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008))
(citing ARIZ. R. EVID. 410; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(f)); People v. Stevens, 610 N.W.2d 881, 886
(Mich. 2000); see also United States v. DeLaurentiis, 638 F.Supp.2d 76, 78-79 (D. Me. 2009)
(allowing for total waiver of Rule 410 in the United States District Court for the District of Maine).
Virginia's court rules appear to bar total waiver, except in limited circumstances during "criminal
proceeding[s] for perjury or false statement." VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:8(c)(6).
2015] CRIMINAL LAW 813
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circuit courts of appeals, have gone further by allowing for total waiver of Rule
410.35 Although their reasons vary, the federal courts rely primarily upon an
extension of Mezzanatto's reasoning;36 because Congress did not forbid waiver,
and the courts have not found anything in Rule 410 that makes waiver
fundamentally unfair, parties may voluntarily waive the rule without violating
37due process.
South Carolina courts followed a similar yet fundamentally different
approach by couching their analyses in contractual terms.38 The South Carolina
Supreme Court adopted the standard used in plea agreements, holding that the
court will enforce any "unambiguous contract according to its terms, regardless
of the contract's wisdom or folly, or the parties' failure to guard their rights
carefully."39 While similar to the federal courts in result, South Carolina's
approach differs fundamentally by focusing on the parties' intent, rather than the
legislative intent behind Rule 410.40 Therefore, while the analysis in this Note is
likely to be applicable to most state and federal courts, it is most applicable to
South Carolina, where the courts have focused on the contractual nature of
proffer agreements.4 '
35. See cases cited supra note 11.
36. See United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Our conclusion
brings us in line with the other circuits that have considered and extended Mezzanatto's reasoning to
permit case-in-chief waivers of Rule 410's protections.").
37. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201.
38. See, e.g., State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 185, 762 S.E.2d 3, 4 (2014) ("[a]pplying the rules
of contract construction" in holding that a proffer agreement waived Rule 410 protections).
39. State v. Compton, 366 S.C. 671, 678, 623 S.E.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Ellis v.
Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994)).
40. Compare id. (relying on the intent of the parties to the agreement), with Mezzanatto, 513
U.S. at 201 (relying on congressional intent).
41. South Carolina plea agreements and proffer agreements, similar to federal plea and
proffer agreements, are construed in accordance with general contract principles. See United States
v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) ("In the process of determining whether disputed plea
agreements have been formed or performed, courts have necessarily drawn on the most relevant
body of developed rules and principles of private law, those pertaining to the formation and
interpretation of commercial contracts."); Compton, 366 S.C. at 677, 623 S.E.2d at 664 ("It is
generally recognized that immunity agreements and plea agreements are to be construed in
accordance with general contract principles."). See generally Peter Westen & David Westin, A
Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978) (applying
a similar analysis to that in this Note in the context of plea agreements). General contract principles
are the "fundamental contractual principles that are generally accepted throughout American
jurisdictions." Arrow Elecs., Inc. v. Hecmma, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 n.2 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
To determine general contract principles, "courts often look to secondary sources such as the
Restatement of Contracts and legal treatises." Id. Because this Note is focused principally on South
Carolina law, this Note will often rely upon statements of contract law adopted by the South
Carolina Supreme Court and the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
814 [VOL. 66: 809
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B. Problems in Drafting Proffer Agreements as Illustrated by State v. Wills
Like any contract, proffer agreements may suffer from flaws that limit the
agreements' effectiveness or render them void. Proffer agreements may fail
because of the duties of the parties, the circumstances under which a party has
42breached, the specified remedies that are unenforceable, or poorly drafted
terms, such as when formation is incomplete.4 3 However, unlike most contracts,
proffer agreements implicate serious due process concerns that may be difficult
to detect and nearly impossible to unwind once committed.
Unlike a trial, or even a plea agreement, proffer agreements may have
relatively undefined terms and requirements.44 The rules of criminal procedure
and evidence determine much of what happens during a criminal trial.45 Where
the rules are ambiguous or fail to address the situation, the courts often derive
guidance from broad constitutional protections and precedent from similar
46 47issues. To some extent, the same is true for plea agreements. Over the past
decades, courts have defined the terms that may be included in a plea
agreement,48 when a plea agreement is concluded,49 and the remedies available
for breach of a plea agreement.50
The same cannot be said for proffer agreements; while the timing of a
proffer agreement's formation is not likely to cause an issue, other aspects, such
as the terms that may be included, when a proffer agreement is concluded, and
when breach occurs, are likely to be persistently controversial because of the
slow pace at which the courts decide issues. These ambiguities create dangerous
incentives for prosecutors. Today, if the courts are willing to ignore egregious
42. See infra Part III.C.
43. See infra Part III.D.
44. See ARTHUR & HUNTER, supra note 18 (citing United States v. Gillion, 704 F.3d 284
(4th Cir. 2012)) (describing the role of proffer agreements).
45. The South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure describe process requirements from
arrest to post-trial matters. See S.C. R. CRIM. P. 1-40. Likewise, plea agreements have been
substantially fleshed out through the courts. See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 486-95 (2006
& Supp. 2014) (collecting cases and summarizing case law regarding plea bargains).
46. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) ("[I]n the exercise of supervisory
powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress.").
47. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that courts must
keep in mind that "the defendant's underlying 'contract' right is constitutionally based").
48. See generally 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 45:17 (2014), available at Westlaw
CRPMAN (noting that "[a]n infinite number of ... concessions which may be of value to some
defendants ... can be created by imaginative counsel").
49. See, e.g., United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1988), quoted in Reed v.
Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 686, 511 S.E.2d 396, 401 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the prosecution is not
bound to the terms of an offer until the defendant performs by pleading guilty).
50. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (remanding to the state court
to decide whether the appropriate remedy for the state's breach of a plea agreement is specific
performance of that agreement or allowing the defendant o withdraw his plea).
2015] 815
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drafting errors,' then prosecutors have incentive to insert nearly any provision
regardless of its potential consequences. The limited review available for
challenging proffer agreements compounds this problem.
Proffer agreements, like plea agreements, receive only one hearing before a
judge to determine their validity.52 Far from the detailed procedures available
for adjudication and discovery of a typical commercial contract,53 the limited
scope of review available for a proffer agreement means that a judge may rule
based only on a single motion and response.54 The lack of evidentiary tools is
compounded by a dearth of judicial guidance. Without either, drafting errors
causing irreparable harm may result.
In Wills, the defendant was charged with accessory after the fact and
55obstruction of justice in relation to a murder. The defendant entered into a
proffer agreement, in which he agreed to truthfully discuss his knowledge of the
56
events in exchange for a favorable sentencing agreement. The defendant also
agreed to submit to a polygraph examination. If the polygraph examination
revealed that the defendant did not speak truthfully or was deceptive, the
defendant agreed to waive the protection of Rule 410 and allow the prosecution
to use his proffer statements for "any legal purpose."5 8  Despite its relative
simplicity, the agreement-broadly excerpted by the dissenting opinion59
60contained contradictions and drafting errors.
Specifically, the dissent noted that the proffer agreement stated that
"[v]iolation of any term of this Proffer renders all terms null and void." 61 As the
dissent concluded, nullifying the contract would be a rescission that returns the
51. See, for example, State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 197, 762 S.E.2d 3, 10 (2014) (Beatty, J.,
dissenting), where Justice Beatty concluded that the majority incorrectly held that the phrase "all
terms null and void," used to describe the remedy for breach, did not refer to rescission of "the
entire agreement, including the waiver provision."
52. See State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 379, 652 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964)); see also Wills, 409 S.C. at 188-89, 762 S.E.2d at
6 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson, 378 U.S. 368) (describing the defendant's objection to use
of statements made following a proffer agreement).
53. The discovery rules available in civil litigation are more generous than those in criminal
litigation. The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure Civil allow for depositions, S.C. R. CIv. P.
27-32; interrogatories, S.C. R. Civ. P. 33; and production of documents, S.C. R. CIV. P. 34, in civil
litigation. Additionally, a jury trial may be requested in a contract dispute case. See S.C. R. CIv. P.
38. In contrast, South Carolina criminal courts do not have depositions, nor is there a clear method
available to discover how a proffer agreement was created. See S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5.
54. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 188-89, 762 S.E.2d at 6 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson,
378 U.S. 368); Miller, 375 S.C. at 379, 652 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77).
55. Wills, 409 S.C. at 186, 762 S.E.2d at 4 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 186-87, 762 S.E.2d at 4-5.
57. See id. at 187, 762 S.E.2d at 5.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 187-88, 762 S.E.2d at 5.
60. See id. at 197, 762 S.E.2d at 10.
61. Id. at 188, 762 S.E.2d at 5.
816 [VOL. 66: 809
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parties to their original position and, therefore, voids the waiver of Rule 410.62
However, the prosecution likely intended to declare a breach, which would
63invoke the waiver clause. The dissent argued that this error created an
ambiguity,64 one that could have been disastrous for the prosecution.
Similarly, the dissent noted that the method to determine breach-a
polygraph examination demonstrating "deception," as determined by the
polygraph examiner65 -was so vague that all the prosecution needed to declare
66breach was to generally allege deception. The dissent found this so abhorrent
that it noted that any defense attorney agreeing to such terms "may be at risk for
an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel."67
Although the dissent also discussed numerous other issues, including the
wisdom of allowing total waiver of Rule 410,68 the drafting issues it identified
were both simple and egregious. While it appears obvious that the prosecution
intended to create "liquidated damages" that would revoke the prosecution's
promise to not seek further charges and allow the prosecution to use the
69defendant's proffer statements in court, the misuse of "null and void" created
unnecessary ambiguity.70 Similarly, while it is advantageous to the prosecution
to use broad terms to determine breach, the terms chosen in this agreement were
nebulous enough to raise ineffective-assistance-of-counsel concerns for the
dissent.7 ' Here again, the prosecution likely could have drafted a sufficient
agreement to the same effect without coming so close to a constitutional
violation. Worst of all, neither the trial court, court of appeals, nor the supreme
court succeeded in addressing these flaws in any substantive way, with the lone
exception of Justice Beatty's dissenting opinion. As a result, it appears that only
careful drafting is sure to prevent harm.
62. Id. at 197, 762 S.E.2d at 10; see also 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 584 (2004) (citing
E.T.C. Corp. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 2 N.E.2d 284, 286 (N.Y. 1936)) ("Generally speaking,
the effect of a rescission is to extinguish the contract and to annihilate it so effectually that, in
contemplation of law, it has never had any existence, even for the purpose of being broken.").
63. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 185, 762 S.E.2d at 4.
64. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 197, 762 S.E.2d at 10 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 187, 762 S.E.2d at 5.
66. Id. at 197, 762 S.E.2d at 10.
67. Id. at 197 n.7, 762 S.E.2d at 10 n.7.
68. See id. at 204-05, 762 S.E.2d at 14.
69. See id. at 185, 762 S.E.2d at 4 (majority opinion).
70. The majority concluded that there was no ambiguity in this agreement. Id. However, the
dissent's statements to the contrary appear more persuasive. See id. at 197, 762 S.E.2d at 10 (Beatty,
J., dissenting).
71. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 197 n.7, 762 S.E.2d at 10 n.7 (Beatty, J., dissenting). See generally
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (citations omitted) (considering what conduct
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel so as to deny a defendant a fair trial).
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III. APPLICATION OF GENERAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO PROFFER
AGREEMENTS
As Wills illustrates, courts may turn to general contract principles to
interpret proffer and plea agreements, but rarely provide context. While this is
not usually problematic with commercial contracts, civil and criminal law are so
different that it is necessary to review their goals and procedures to provide
proper context. This Part provides contract principles and compares their
application in civil and criminal law to illustrate where courts have used the
principles correctly or, conversely, have taken them out of context.
A. Interpretation of Proffer Agreements
Like any contract, proffer agreements must be drafted with an eye to a
court's most likely interpretation of its terms. This is especially true for proffer
72agreements because even relatively clear language can be misinterpreted.
Therefore, parties should be prepared to brief and address not only their
interpretation of the agreement, but also the principles that the court should rely
upon in its interpretation. With that purpose in mind, this Section addresses the
rules of construction for proffer agreements and their application.
Courts liberally construe contracts to give effect to the parties' intent
because that intent is the court's primary concern.73 Before any other action, the
court will attempt to determine the parties' intent from the language of the
contract.74 To do so, the court must look to the language of the contract, and if it
is "plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no
construction is required and its language determines the instrument's force and
75 76effect." Whether language is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.
72. See supra Part II.B.
73. See, e.g., Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v. Outparcel Assocs., 374 S.C. 483, 497, 649
S.E.2d 494, 501 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Mishoe v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 234 S.C. 182,
188, 107 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1958) (per curiam)) ("Contracts should be liberally construed so as to give
them effect and carry out the intention of the parties.").
74. Id. at 497-98, 649 S.E.2d at 501 (citing Schulmeyer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 353
S.C. 491, 495, 579 S.E.2d 132, 134 (2003); C.A.N. Enters. v. S.C. Health & Human Servs. Fin.
Comm'n., 296 S.C. 373, 377, 373 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1988); Jacobs v. Serv. Merch. Co., 297 S.C.
123, 128, 375 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Ct. App. 1988)).
75. Id. at 499, 649 S.E.2d at 502 (citing Jordan v. Sec. Group, Inc., 311 S.C. 227, 230, 428
S.E.2d 705, 707 (1993); Blakeley v. Rabon, 266 S.C. 68, 72, 221 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1976)); see also
Heins v Heins, 344 S.C. 146, 158, 543 S.E.2d 224, 230 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Superior Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Maners, 261 S.C. 257, 263, 199 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1973) (per curiam)) ("To discover the
intention of a contract, the court must first look to its language-if the language is perfectly plain
and capable of legal construction, it alone determines the document's force and effect.").
76. Ecclesiastes, 374 S.C. at 500, 649 S.E.2d at 503 (citing S.C. Dep't of Natural Res. v.
Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 623, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302-03 (2001); S. Atl. Fin. Servs., Inc.
v. Middleton, 349 S.C. 77, 81, 562 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Ct. App. 2002), affd as modified, 356 S.C.
444, 590 S.E.2d 27 (2003)).
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An ambiguous contract is "one capable of being understood in more senses than
one, an agreement obscure in meaning, through indefiniteness of expression, or
having a double meaning." Lastly, "[t]he court must enforce an unambiguous
contract according to its terms, regardless of the contract's wisdom or folly, or
the parties' failure to guard their rights carefully."7 8
In proffer and plea agreements,79 ambiguity derives most often from two
sources: the circumstances under which the prosecution must perform its
promise0 and the remedies available for a criminal defendant's breach.8' While
these issues are discussed in greater detail later in this Note, one contract
interpretation principle is of central importance to proffer agreements'
interpretation: contra proferentem.
Contra proferentem states:
[A]mbiguous language in a contract should be construed
liberally and most strongly in favor of the party who did not
write or prepare the contract and is not responsible for the
ambiguity; and any ambiguity in a contract, doubt, or
uncertainty as to its meaning should be resolved against the
party who prepared the contract or is responsible for the
82verbiage.
Contra proferentem has been "steadfastly applied to plea agreements,"83
which likely necessitates application of the principle in the interpretation of
proffer agreements.84  Additionally, contra proferentem mirrors a similar
77. Carolina Ceramics, Inc. v. Carolina Pipeline Co., 251 S.C. 151, 155-56, 161 S.E.2d 179,
181 (1968) (per curiam) (citing Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C. 155, 160, 127 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1962)).
78. Ecclesiastes, 374 S.C. at 500, 649 S.E.2d at 503 (citing Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245,
248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994); Jordan, 311 S.C. at 230, 428 S.E.2d at 707)).
79. Plea agreements are discussed in this Section because much, if not all, of the case law on
point for proffer agreements is derived from plea agreement cases. See ALEXANDER SANDERS &
JOHN S. NICHOLS, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYERS § 18:8 (5th ed. 2014)
(citing S.C. R. EVID. 410; United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); State v. Wills, 409
S.C. 183, 762 S.E.2d 3 (2014); State v. Compton, 366 S.C. 671, 623 S.E.2d 661 (Ct. App. 2005))
(discussing proffer agreements and Rule 410 waiver in the context of statements made during plea
negotiations). Indeed, proffer agreements are often made in the context of reaching a plea
agreement. See id. (citing Compton, 366 S.C. at 679, 623 S.E.2d at 665). Therefore, this Section
discusses the two together and contrasts plea and proffer agreements where the rules likely differ.
80. See infra Part III.B.1.
81. See infra Part 1II.D.
82. Myrtle Beach Lumber Co. v. Willoughby, 276 S.C. 3, 8, 274 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1981)
(alteration in original) (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 425 (2011)).
83. Wills, 409 S.C. at 196, 762 S.E.2d at 10 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006)).
84. See id. at 197, 762 S.E.2d at 10 ("As drafted by the State, section 7 of the proffer
agreement states . . . .").
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criminal law principle known as the rule of lenity, which requires ambiguities in
the application of a statute to be resolved in favor of the criminal defendant.8 5
Contra proferentem likely applies in proffer agreement cases for numerous
reasons. First, and most obvious, is that the government typically drafts the
proffer agreement.86 Second, proffer agreements are adhesive, "offered on a
'take-it-or-leave-it' basis with terms that are not negotiable."88  Proffer
agreements fit this description because "defendants are generally in no position
to challenge demands for these waivers, and the use of waiver provisions as
contracts of adhesion has become accepted practice."89  Third, and most
importantly, the courts have already held that this is the accepted standard.90
Because courts have applied contra proferentem so pointedly to plea
agreements,9 1 prosecutors must take extreme care in drafting proffer agreements.
Despite the court's acceptance of the poorly drafted proffer agreement in Wills,92
the issues in that case could easily have swayed the court to rule differently.
Therefore, the remainder of this Note often recommends more careful language
to protect against different interpretations by other courts.
B. Principles of Contract Formation
Like all contracts, proffer agreements are subject to formation
requirements.93 These requirements, while basic, are ultimately important to
consider because they control how parties should approach proffer agreements
and dictate the timing for entering a proffer agreement. Proffer agreements
require offer, acceptance, and consideration.94 Proffer agreements are also
subject to such formation defects as inadequate consideration, duress,
85. E.g., Bryant v. State, 384 S.C. 525, 533, 683 S.E.2d 280, 284 (2009) (citing State v.
Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273-74, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991)) ("[T]he rule of lenity requires that
the doubt must be resolved in the defendant's favor.").
86. Wills, 409 S.C. at 196, 762 S.E.2d at 10 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting Transfiguracion,
442 F.3d at 1228).
87. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 26-27, 644 S.E.2d 663, 669 (2007)
(citing Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 541, 542 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001)).
89. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 216 (Souter, J., dissenting), quoted in Wills, 409 S.C. at 201, 762
S.E.2d at 12 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Wills, 409 S.C. at 196-97, 762 S.E.2d at 10 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d at 1228) ("Moreover, '[a]s a defendant's liberty is at
stake, the government is ordinarily held to the literal terms of the plea agreement it made so that the
government gets what it bargains for but nothing more."').
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. See supra Part II.B.
93. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 25, § 23:26 (citing United States v. Williams, 510
F.3d 416, 421-22 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998))
("A proffer agreement, like a plea bargain itself, is a contract, and therefore is interpreted in accord
with general contract law principles.").
94. See infra Parts III.B.1-3.
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unconscionability, and due process violations.95  However, courts have not
addressed many of the issues that arise by applying general contract principles to
96proffer agreements. This stands in stark contrast to plea agreements, which
have had specific rules set by common law in order to ensure that they do not run
afoul of due process.97 As a result, this Part addresses several issues apparent in
proffer agreements' timing and formation, and suggests steps to address those
issues.
1. Offers
At the simplest level, the most basic issues of offer and acceptance affect the
gaps in proffer agreement interpretation. As in a commercial contract, there is
great power in being an offeree to a proffer agreement.9 Whether a party has
the power of acceptance will greatly alter that party's bargaining power and
carries due process concerns for prosecutorial agreements.99 Therefore,
determining the offeror is of grave importance to the fairness of a proffer
agreement.
To be clear, there is no issue as to what constitutes an offer; an offer is the
"manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will
conclude it."' 00 Additionally, an offer identifies the bargained-for exchange and
gives the offeree the power of acceptance.'0 ' Instead, the issue is which party is
the offeror: whether the prosecutor must always be the offeror or if proffer
agreements, unlike plea agreements, allow for either party to be the offeror.102
Answering this question is of fundamental importance to prosecutors. If
prosecutors always act as offeror, as in plea agreements,103 they would have an
incentive to offer deals with less consideration in return for the defendant's
95. See infra Parts III.B.3-4.
96. See infra Part III.B.l.
97. See, e.g., SANDERS & NICHOLS, supra note 79, § 31:14 (citations omitted) (discussing
inducements that do, and do not, run afoul of constitutional protections).
98. Cf Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678
(2000) (citations omitted) (considering the effect of the UCC's "battle of the forms" provision on
commercial actors).
99. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
100. Prescott v. Farmers Tel. Coop., 335 S.C. 330, 336, 516 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1999) (quoting
Carolina Amusement Co. v. Conn. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 313 S.C. 215, 220, 437 S.E.2d 122, 125 (Ct.
App. 1993)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) (defining "offer").
101. Prescott, 335 S.C. at 336, 516 S.E.2d at 926 (quoting Carolina Amusement Co., 313 S.C.
at 220, 437 S.E.2d at 125); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29(1) (1981) ("The
manifested intention of the offeror determines the person or persons in whom is created a power of
acceptance.").
102. Cf State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 389, 652 S.E.2d 444, 454 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Reed
v. Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 688, 511 S.E.2d 396, 402 (Ct. App. 1999)) (describing plea agreements as
offers by the prosecution requiring acceptance by the defendant, the offeree).
103. See id. (citing Reed, 333 S.C. at 688, 511 S.E.2d at 402).
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statement, and to require defendants to agree quickly.104 On the other hand, if
defendants are capable of acting as offeror, prosecutors may have a strong
incentive to negotiate more generous terms, but delay acceptance until the
prosecution is sure that no further investigation will aide in negotiating.
Although the courts have not specifically decided whether the prosecutor must
be the offeror in a proffer agreement, it is likely that the same purpose and due
process concerns applicable to plea agreements would require the prosecution to
be the offeror in proffer agreements.
In a plea agreement, due process likely requires a criminal defendant to act
as offeree because plea agreements are not complete until the defendant enters
the plea before the court. o0 This serves an evidentiary purpose, allowing the
defendant's plea in court to show that it was made voluntarily.106  Further,
defendants may withdraw from a plea agreement any time before the plea is
entered before the court.0 7 In contrast, prosecutors may not withdraw from the
agreement if the criminal defendant has detrimentally relied upon the offer. os
The same reasoning likely applies to proffer agreements. Proffer agreements
share the same power disparity between prosecution and defendant as plea
agreements.109 This typically raises due process concerns, especially where a
defendant surrenders a right."10 Further, the agreements' shared procedures
make it effectively impossible to reverse precedent requiring the prosecution to
be the offeror. The case law is simply too one-sided and there does not appear to
be a great enough advantage available to argue that the defendant could be the
offeror. Therefore, both prosecution and defense should assume that the
prosecution will be the offeror and make clear that the criminal defendant is the
one who must accept the agreement.
2. Nature ofAcceptance
The nature of acceptance in a proffer agreement remains unsettled. Whether
a proffer agreement is bilateral or unilateral may radically alter the proffer
agreement's timing; if proffer agreements are treated like plea agreements, which
104. Cf Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 5, at 4 (citing United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d
213, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)) (noting the pressure defendants have to cooperate with the government,
which first requires signing the government's proffer agreement).
105. Reed, 333 S.C. at 685, 511 S.E.2d at 401 (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-
08(1984)).
106. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (quoting Brain v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).
107. Miller, 375 S.C. at 389, 652 S.E.2d at 454 (citing Reed, 333 S.C. at 688, 511 S.E.2d at
402).
108. Id. (citing Reed, 333 S.C. at 688, 511 S.E.2d at 402-03).
109. See Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 5, at 4 (quoting Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 217).
110. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
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are unilateral,"' the performance provides evidence of the agreement and helps
protect the defendant from entering the agreement without fully understanding
its effect. However, a unilateral proffer agreement may allow a defendant to
void a signed proffer agreement after obtaining some benefit. In contrast, if
proffer agreements are treated as bilateral contracts, a prosecutor may be able to
enforce a defendant's agreement to confess his role in a crime, even if he
subsequently refuses to do so. Given the vast differences in these
characterizations, both parties should be aware of their application in plea and
proffer agreements.' 12
The reasons for making plea agreements unilateral, and why proffer
agreements differ as a result, is relatively simple: plea agreements are set by
more stringent constitutional protections and attendant court proceedings13 than
proffer agreements.114 First, a court cannot force a defendant to plead guilty, so
a promise to do so in a plea agreement cannot be enforced."5 Second, the plea
agreement provides a definite event delineating when performance is complete
because plea agreements may only be performed under the formal proceedings of
the court."16
In contrast, the same timing and due process arguments cannot be applied to
proffer agreements so easily. First, a proffer statement does not need to be
entered in the same way before the court to be enforceable.' 17 Additionally,
proffer agreements do not share the same degree of finality as plea
agreements,"8 and therefore require less scrutiny. As a result, there may not be a
111. See Miller, 375 S.C. at 389, 652 S.E.2d at 454 (citing Reed, 333 S.C. at 686-87, 511
S.E.2d at 402); see also United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that
absent explicit promissory language, a plea agreement is only a unilateral offer until a defendant's
plea is accepted by the court). A unilateral contract is a contract for which only one party provides a
promise and the other party may accept only by actual performance. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
374 (9th ed. 2009). A bilateral contract, on the other hand, is a contract made by the exchange of
mutual promises from both parties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 367 (9th ed. 2009).
112. Proffer and plea agreements are compared in this Section to illustrate where they differ
and to illustrate where plea agreement case law may be incorrect for proffer agreements. Because
there is currently very little case law specifically relating to proffer agreements, practitioners should
be prepared to address this as an issue of first impression.
113. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (noting the necessity for
"safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances").
114. See supra notes 53-5 6 and accompanying text.
115. Papaleo, 853 F.2d at 19-20.
116. Reed, 333 S.C. at 685, 688, 511 S.E.2d at 401-02 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262).
117. See State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 188, 762 S.E.2d 3, 5 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting)
(noting that the prosecution entered the defendant's proffer statement without prior adjudication of
the proffer agreement).
118. Compare Benjamin A. Naftalis, "Queen for a Day" Agreements and the Proper Scope of
Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7
(2003) (describing the effects proffer agreements have had on the prosecutorial process), with
Bailey v. MacDougall, 247 S.C. 1, 8, 145 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1965) ("A plea of guilty is a confession
of guilt made in a formal manner and is equivalent to and as binding as a conviction after a trial on
the merits.").
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specific moment where the parties can be certain that a proffer agreement has
been completed. Proffer agreements could arguably be completed at the time of
execution,119 at the time the defendant makes a proffer statement, when the
prosecution makes an affirmative act to confirm the agreement, or even as late as
the prosecution's attempt to enter a proffered statement as evidence in court.
Although the latter possibilities are less likely, the ambiguity leaves open the
possibility that a court could hold them proper. For instance, one could argue
that until the prosecution acts on the agreement, performance has not occurred
and the defendant is free to withdraw.120
If a proffer agreement must be unilateral, these ambiguities will make it
difficult for prosecutors to enforce a proffer agreement. Take, for example, a
criminal who signs a typical proffer agreement that requires the defendant to
give an honest recitation of the defendant's knowledge of a crime; if the
defendant is determined to have been dishonest, the defendant will be in breach
and the proffer statement may be used against the defendant at trial. If the
agreement does not define what constitutes acceptance, the defendant could
possibly withdraw from the agreement, even after delivering the proffer
statement. This would allow a defendant who has been materially dishonest in a
proffer statement to "withdraw" from an otherwise valid proffer agreement
without penalty. While unlikely, this scenario demonstrates the potential harm
to the prosecution in making proffer agreements with undefined terms.
However, treating proffer agreements as bilateral agreements is not a perfect
solution either, as doing so shifts performance issues to the defense instead. For
instance, a defendant may be bound even if the defendant has made no statement
and decides to withdraw consent on advice of counsel.121 In such a scenario, it is
not clear if the defendant could be compelled to make a proffer statement or if
the defendant would be unable to negotiate further.122 While it seems unlikely
that courts would require a defendant to make a proffer statement, it seems
equally unlikely that a court would allow the defendant to withdraw from a
bilateral agreement without consequence. As a result, parties might not choose
to characterize a proffer agreement as bilateral. Until courts clarify this issue,
there may be no clear answer. Therefore, both prosecution and defense should
carefully define the nature of the agreement.
A good first step is for the prosecution to explicitly define what will
constitute acceptance. Because courts interpret contracts to give meaning to the
119. At least one court has held that a proffer agreement is effective upon signing. See United
States v. Washburn, 728 F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Miller, 295 F.3d 824,
827 (8th Cir. 2002)).
120. See State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 389, 652 S.E.2d 444, 454 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Reed,
333 S.C. at 687, 511 S.E.2d at 402).
121. See Washburn, 728 F.3d at 780-81.
122. In Washburn, the court held that the defendant could not seek to further negotiate plea
agreements after breaching. See id. at 782.
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parties' intentl23 and plea or proffer agreements could possibly be drafted as
bilateral contracts,124 a clause clearly making the agreement valid upon execution
could provide more certainty, as well as a more favorable outcome for
prosecutors. Even if proffer agreements cannot be drafted as purely bilateral
contracts, the prosecution may improve its chances of enforcing a proffer
agreement by requiring that the defendant make a brief recitation of his
knowledge immediately after signing. Requiring the defendant to begin
performance should satisfy the requirements of acceptance for a unilateral
contract.125 These steps, if taken proactively, should avert any attack by the
defense.
Defense counsel should assume that the moment the proffer agreement is
signed the defendant will be bound by the agreement and required to deliver a
proffer statement. Therefore, the defense should either clarify what will
constitute acceptance or delay signing until the defense is certain of its decision.
These steps would not give the defense an immense advantage, but would assure
that the defendant will not be surprised by the prosecution's actions.
3. Consideration
Of greater (and more realistic) concern than offer and acceptance is the
proffer agreement with no real consideration. Because proffer agreements often
give the prosecution discretion to determine whether the defendant has
breached,126 the prosecution may offer illusory consideration in the agreement.
Such a situation could void an otherwise valid agreement or prevent the
defendant's waiver from being effective.
Valuable consideration is a necessary element of any contract,127 including
pleal28 and proffer agreements.129 While consideration is generally a simple
123. See, e.g., Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v. Outparcel Assocs., 374 S.C. 483, 499, 649
S.E.2d 494, 502 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 358 S.C. 78, 93, 594 S.E.2d 485,
493 (Ct. App. 2004)) (noting the court's obligation to give effect to the parties' intent).
124. See United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasis added)
("Absent more explicit promissory language, we will not read the ambiguous language of the
'agreement' as containing bilateral promises such as to bind the government to a contract
unenforceable against the other party.").
125. See Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 461, 450 S.E.2d 589, 594 (1994) (citing E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.24 (1982)) (discussing the performance requirement of
unilateral contracts).
126. See, e.g., State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 187, 762 S.E.2d 3, 5 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting)
(restating the proffer agreement at issue, which gives the state authority to determine whether
breach has occurred).
127. See Benya v. Gamble, 282 S.C. 624, 628, 321 S.E.2d 57, 60 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing
McCraw v. Llewellyn, 123 S.E.2d 575, 578 (N.C. 1962)).
128. See State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 293, 440 S.E.2d 341, 347 (1994) (citing United States v.
Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993)).
129. See United States v. Heatley, 39 F. Supp. 2d 287, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that the
government did not breach a duty of good faith consideration).
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concept, the floor of what constitutes consideration is difficult to define. In
general, the forbearance of some right will be sufficient for the court to find
consideration.130 Criminal defendants entering proffer agreements clearly satisfy
this standard; waiver of Rule 410 is an obvious forbearance of value to the
prosecution.131 Similarly, on the face of many proffer agreements, the
prosecution offers some valuable consideration-promises not to bring
132 133
additional charges, sentencing recommendations, or even a promise simply
to begin plea bargaining.134  However, the conditions that prosecutors often
require before their performance implicates the issue of whether the promise is
illusory.135
An illusory promise is one in which a promise is made in form only; the
party making the promise is not actually promising to give up anything.136 As
such, an illusory promise cannot serve as consideration.137 A common example
is a situation where a promisor may choose whether to perform or not, based
"solely on the condition of his whim."138 It can be difficult to strictly define the
circumstances under which a decision will be considered unjustified. 139 An
illustrative example of this point is a satisfaction clause, which conditions one
party's performance on the other party's satisfaction with the first's
performance.140 Satisfaction clauses have been almost universally upheld,141 as
courts have held that a party's duty to act in good faith serves as the limitation on
the promisor's discretion.142 A breach of good faith could be difficult to prove,
which may make it effectively impossible for a party to prove a promise is
illusory.
130. Caine & Estes Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Watts, 278 S.C. 207, 209, 293 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1982)
(citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Lions Gate, 273 S.C. 88, 91, 254 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1979)).
131. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203-04 (1995).
132. See State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 187, 762 S.E.2d 3, 5 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting).
133. See State v. Riddle, 278 S.C. 148, 150, 292 S.E.2d 795, 796 (1982) (citing Lambert v.
State, 260 S.C. 617, 621, 198 S.E.2d 118, 119-20 (1973); Bailey v. MacDougall, 247 S.C. 1, 14,
145 S.E.2d 425, 432 (1965)) (noting that the prosecution fulfills it obligation by recommending a
particular sentence, regardless of whether or not the judge accepts that recommendation).
134. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 207.
135. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 205, 762 S.E.2d at 14 (Beatty, J. dissenting).
136. 3 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:7 (4th ed. 2008).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a, illus. 1-2 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 78 (1932)).
139.See Val D. Ricks, In Defense ofMutuality of Obligation: Why "Both Should Be Bound, or
Neither, " 78 NEB. L. Rev. 491, 497 (1999).
140. See 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 38:21 (4th ed. 2013) (citations
omitted).
141. Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id. (citations omitted).
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The dissent in Wills insinuates that certain practices, such as polygraphs,
may make the prosecution's promise illusory.143  While prosecutors have
incentives to condition their promises on a defendant being truthful or passing a
polygraph, numerous possible problems counsel against their use. First, vague
conditional descriptions of prohibited conduct triggering breach, such as
"deceptiveness," make applying those standards difficult.1 44 Second, incentives
exist for prosecutors not only to predicate breach on the prosecutor's sole
discretion, as the dissent in Wills suggested occurred,145 but to ask questions
designed to cause an honest defendant to appear deceptive.
Take, for example a situation where a criminal defendant is accused of
robbing a bank. During a proffer session, the police investigator asks the
defendant the time the defendant walked into the bank. The criminal defendant
says about 12:30 but is, in fact, mistaken. Instead, the defendant walked in at
12:45. At this point, if the prosecutor is the sole judge of deceptiveness, the
prosecutor may have sufficient cause to find that the defendant was deceptive
and breached the agreement as a result. Although courts may be unwilling to
accept such a small discrepancy, the trial court in Wills required no evidence
beyond a polygraph examiner's statement that the defendant was deceptive.146
No evidence was presented as to how Wills was deceptive, nor did the
prosecution explain how it determined he was being deceptive.147
While Wills lends support to a low threshold for evidence of breach, there
are many reasons to believe that other courts may not be so accommodating and,
instead, may require a higher threshold for evidence of breach. First, it should
be noted that there was some issue in Wills as to whether Wills properly
challenged the prosecution's evidence.148 Even if the challenge was made, it
does not appear that the defense did much beyond preserve the challenge for the
record. 149
The alternative to these conditions of breach, in comparison, is relatively
simple and leaves a prosecutor well protected, regardless of trial strategy.
Prosecutors should state that "any material dishonesty, including material
omissions, will be treated as a breach." This minor tweak invokes the standards
of breach available through general contract principles and provides a fair
starting point for the prosecution and defense. Ironically, this language does not
143. See State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 197, 762 S.E.2d 3, 10 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting) ("In
essence, the State rescinded the agreement and avoided its contractual obligations by merely
alleging Petitioner's statement was deceptive and nothing more.").
144. While no apparent definition has been adopted for deception in criminal cases, the South
Carolina Supreme Court adopted the tautological definition that "[a]n act is 'deceptive' when it has
a tendency to deceive." Gentry v. Yonce, 337 S.C. 1, 12, 522 S.E.2d 137, 143 (1999) (citing Harris
v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of N.C., 355 S.E.2d 838, 844 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)).
145. Wills, 409 S.C. at 205, 762 S.E.2d at 14 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 188, 205, 762 S.E.2d at 5, 14.
147. See id. at 188-89, 762 S.E.2d at 5-6.
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fully prevent a prosecutor from attempting to prove a breach with little evidence,
but enables the defense to use relevant case law to challenge weak showings. It
should be emphasized that remarkably little is needed to prove that a promise is
not illusory, so this provision should do little to harm the prosecution while
providing protection to defendants from illusory promises.
4. Voluntariness
Ultimately, questions about proffer agreements' validity devolve into one of
voluntariness. The procedure used to determine whether a proffer agreement is
valid, the Denno hearing, is designed to determine if a statement was made
voluntarily,15 0 and if the proffer agreement was entered involuntarily, it will be
inadmissible.15 ' As a result, whether an agreement is voluntary is not only
important to consider in its own right, but also as the means to make any
challenge to a proffer agreement.
While general contract principles can provide sleek solutions for some
formation issues, the requirement for voluntariness in criminal cases differs in
many ways from the contract law requirement of a meeting of the minds. Plea
and proffer agreements are governed by the Denno standard,152 which requires
that a defendant's statement to the prosecution be made "knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily."1 53  The courts have not adopted a definitive
statement as to what is voluntary, but South Carolina courts have stated that they
will consider the totality of the circumstances, including "background,
experience, and conduct of the accused; age; length of custody; police
misrepresentations; isolation of a minor from his or her parent; threats of
violence; and promises of leniency."154 Further, a statement may not be
"extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, [or] obtained by the exertion of improper
influence."'15 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
''coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a [statement]
is not 'voluntary,""156 which is determined from the perspective of the
defendant. 1 In effect, the voluntariness standard is defined by what parties
cannot do, rather than by what they can.
150. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 394 (1964).
151. Cf id. (indicating that convictions cannot be based on involuntary confessions).
152. See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 395-96.
153. State v. Compton, 366 S.C. 671, 680, 623 S.E.2d 661, 666 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting State
v. Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 660, 552 S.E.2d 745, 757 (2001), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 105-06, 610 S.E.2d 494, 501 (2005)).
154. State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 386, 652 S.E.2d 444, 452 (Ct. App. 2007).
155. Id. at 386, 652 S.E.2d at 452 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Rochester, 301
S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990)).
156. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
157. Miller, 375 S.C. at 386, 652 S.E.2d at 452 (quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296
(1990)).
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This concept differs from the "meeting of the minds," which contains
affirmative requirements for parties' conduct.5 8  The meeting of the minds
required to form a contract
is not based on secret purpose or intention on the part of one of the
parties, stored away in his mind and not brought to the attention of the
other party, but must be based on purpose and intention which has been
made known or which, from all the circumstances, should be known.5 9
Therefore, rather than prohibiting only certain conduct, a meeting of the
minds requires the parties to make their intentions known to all parties.
However, the voluntariness and meeting of the minds standards are similar in
what types of conduct are specifically prohibited.
Compare, for instance, duress and the Denno standard. Duress is defined as
"coercion that puts a person in such fear that he is 'bereft' of the quality of mind
essential to the making of a contract and the contract was thereby obtained as a
result of this state of mind."160 Similarly, "unconscionability is defined as the
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract
provisions, together with terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person
would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them."161 While
the Denno standard differs from duress in some ways, it reflects a high standard
of protection for parties-at least on paper.162
158. See Player v. Chandler, 299 S.C. 101, 105, 382 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1989)
(citing McClintockv. Skelly Oil Co., 114 S.W.2d 181, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938)).
159. Id. at 105, 382 S.E.2d at 894 (citing McClintock, 114 S.W.2d at 189).
160. Hyman v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 735, 744 (D.S.C. 2001) (citing Phillips v.
Baker, 284 S.C. 134, 137, 325 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1985); Cherry v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Cas.
Co., 191 S.C. 177, 183, 4 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1939); In re Nightingale's Estate, 182 S.C. 527, 545, 189
S.E. 890, 897 (1937)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) ("If a
party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.").
161. Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 25, 644 S.E.2d 663, 668 (2007)
(citing Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc., 361 S.C. 544, 554, 606 S.E.2d
752, 757 (2004)).
162. In Crane v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that circumstances of how a
confession was obtained must be permitted to be introduced as evidence to the jury, even if it has
already been ruled on at a Denno hearing, because "a defendant's case may stand or fall on his
ability to convince the jury that the manner in which the confession was obtained casts doubt on its
credibility." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986). See generally Frederick Alexander et al.,
Project, Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts
of Appeals 1985-1986, 75 GEO. L.J. 713, 824-25 (1987) (citations omitted) (discussing the
admissibility of statements by criminal defendants). In Wills, the judge limited the defense to
making only a reference to the confession occurring as part of a proffer agreement. See State v.
Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 189, 762 S.E.2d 3, 6 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting).
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In practice, neither the civill63 nor the criminal standard is enforced to such a
rigid degree; in both criminal and civil actions, courts have essentially
disregarded these safeguards and instead allow nearly any contract to be
enforced, "regardless of the contract's folly or wisdom."164 Therefore, while
both general contract principles and proffer agreements profess to have some
requirement for meeting of the minds, the courts have granted wide discretion
for enforcement of an agreement, regardless of any formation issue.
The difference between theoretical and practical protection is problematic
for criminal cases. While the difference may be explained, if not excused, for
commercial contracts, criminal law should reflect a greater concern. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the widely cited opinion United
States v. Harvey,165 stated that unlike contract law, a criminal defendant's right
to contract is "constitutionally based and therefore reflects concerns that differ
fundamentally from and run wider than those of commercial contract law."166
Rather than concerning itself with the needs of a free market, the criminal court
instead focuses on the constitutional rights of the individual and, more broadly,
maintaining public confidence in the fair administration of justice.167 Of course,
these goals and protections do not bar or even radically limit a criminal
defendant's ability to waive the defendant's rights or enter into a plea agreement,
but they should act to provide some protection. However, these protections are
only useful if they are adequately enforced.
The application of a contract standard, adopted by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Wills, allows the enforcement of a contract "regardless of
the . . . wisdom" of a party's consent to its enforcement,168 yet offers less
protection than that addressed in Harvey.169 While there are times that general
contract principles aid the courts in fleshing out a body of law, the South
Carolina Supreme Court appears to have overstepped in its adoption of such a
low standard for proffer and plea agreements.
In practice, the waiver and conditions allowed in Wills, while possibly able
to survive challenges in the current South Carolina Supreme Court, may not
survive similar challenges in the federal courts or, possibly, a different
composition of the South Carolina Supreme Court. Irrespective of the courts'
inclination to change course, prosecutors can easily circumvent the issue by
simply ensuring that defendants receive adequate notice of the proffer
163. See Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA.
L. REV. 443, 444 (2005) ("Even after the passage of half a century since Dawson's observations, the
duress doctrine remains largely unusable, though courts frequently attempt to use it.").
164. State v. Compton, 366 S.C. 671, 678, 623 S.E.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Ellis v.
Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994)).
165. 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986).
166. Id. at 300.
167. See United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972).
168. See State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 185, 762 S.E.2d 3, 4 (2014).
169. See Harvey, 791 F.2d at 300 (recognizing that constitutional considerations affect
contract analysis in criminal cases).
830 [VOL. 66: 809
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss4/6
CRIMINAL LAW
agreement's contents and that the defendant is adequately represented. First,
prosecutors should require defense counsel to sign the proffer agreement, in
addition to the defendant, to make clear that the defense counsel has discussed
the ramifications of the proffer agreement with the attorney's client. Second, it
is likely wise to require the defendant to handwrite a statement that makes clear
the defendant has read the agreement, is aware of its terms, and is agreeing
voluntarily. Third, rather than making better deals, it may actually be in the
favor of prosecutors to require total waiver of Rule 410 as a condition to any
plea bargaining.17 0  Finally, if a prosecutor assures that the same conditions
required to waive constitutional rights are met, there will almost assuredly be no
issue for the waiver of the procedural protection offered by Rule 410.171
For the defense, there is not much that should be done, but there is an
opportunity for actual negotiation. First, as always, defense counsel should
explain all of the terms and conditions to the attorney's client. The defense
counsel should be sure that the defendant is aware of the extreme consequences
of breach. Second, if the prosecution requires the defendant to handwrite a
statement, the defense should use this as an opportunity to alter the terms of the
agreement. Rather than just allowing the defendant to write the statement, the
defense counsel should take the opportunity to annotate any requested changes to
the agreement. While there is no guarantee that the prosecution will agree to
these terms, any opportunity to add to the contract is an ideal time to make
alterations as well.
C. Determining Breach
When a contract is disputed, as breached proffer agreements commonly are,
the method and process of determining breach often determines the outcome.
Because the criminal system's procedures are limited, it is vital for both defense
and prosecution to know what terms determine breach and the procedures the
court will use to make a finding.
1. Procedure
Denno hearings, which have become the default process for plea
agreements,172 present procedural and substantive challenges in determining
170. Cf Lisa A. Mathewson, An Ironic Corollary to the Proffer Problem: Dead-to-Rights Is
Better Off CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 14, 15 (suggesting that attorneys who recommend
proffers during plea negotiations should consider Rule 410).
171. See generally 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 142 (2005) (citations omitted) (discussing
the "high degree of proof' that "is required for the establishment of a waiver of constitutional
rights").
172. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 379, 652 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1984)) (describing the process for determining the
admissibility of a defendant's statement).
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breach. Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court's apparent blessing of
polygraph examinations to determine breach renews the dispute over the proper
role of polygraphs in criminal law.1 73
Jackson v. Denno created the procedures that have been used for statements
made by defendants.174  Denno hearings are conducted to determine the
voluntariness of a statement.175 As a byproduct, in proffer agreement cases, the
court must also determine whether the conditions of a proffer agreement have
been breached.176 While all Denno hearings share common basic elements, they
vary in procedure from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.7 7  In South Carolina, the
Denno hearing process is bifurcated.7 8 First, the judge conducts an evidentiary
hearing outside of the presence of the jury, where the State must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily made the
statement. 179 When dealing with a proffer agreement, the State must also show
that the proffer agreement is valid and enforceable.80 If the trial judge believes
the agreement was enforceable and the statement was voluntary, then the
statement is submitted to the jury, which must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the statement was voluntarily made.'8'
173. See, e.g., Wills, 409 S.C. at 204, 762 S.E.2d at 14 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern about the State's use of a polygraph examination to determine that the defendant was not
truthful and had therefore breached the proffer agreement); Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 533,
657 S.E.2d 771, 778 (2008) (quoting State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 23-24, 515 S.E.2d 508, 519-20
(1999)) (expressing concerns over the reliability of polygraph examinations and doubts about the
admissibility of polygraph examination results). See generally 6 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note
25, § 41:6 (explaining that all states except New Mexico exclude polygraph examinations as
evidence of truthfulness).
174. See Miller, 375 S.C. at 379, 652 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77).
175. See supra Part III.B.4.
176. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 188-89, 762 S.E.2d at 5-6 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
177See WILLIAM E.RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 30:2
2d ed. 2014) (citations omitted), available at Westlaw SSAC.
178. See Miller, 375 S.C. at 379, 652 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376; State v.
Washington, 296 S.C. 54, 56, 370 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1988)).
179. Id. at 379, 652 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376).
180. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 188-89, 762 S.E.2d at 6 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
181. See Miller, 375 S.C. at 379, 652 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Washington, 296 S.C. at 56, 370
S.E.2d at 612). One issue that has not been fully resolved is whether the proffer agreement should
be sent to the jury as well. In Wills, the trial judge conducted a Denno hearing to determine that the
defendant had signed a proffer agreement and that his statement was voluntary. Wills, 409 S.C. at
188-89, 762 S.E.2d at 6 (Beatty, J., dissenting). Though the jury was charged with determining
whether the statement was made voluntarily, the judge barred any reference to the use of a
polygraph examination. Id. at 189, 762 S.E.2d at 6. Additionally, the defense was allowed to explain
to the jury that the statement was made as part of a proffer agreement. Id. at 189, 762 S.E.2d at 6.
The exclusion of the means for proving breach meant that the trial judge alone determined whether
the defendant breached. It is not clear whether the trial judge barred mention of the polygraph
because the jury did not need to determine whether the defendant breached or because polygraphs
cannot be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial. See State v. Wright, 322 S.C. 253, 255, 471
S.E.2d 700, 701 (1996) (citing State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 582, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982)).
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There are many situations where a defendant may technically breach a
proffer agreement but significantly fewer that should invoke the waiver clause of
a proffer agreement. Whether a breach is minor or material determines what
remedy, if any, should be granted.182 As the nature of a breach is a question of
fact, rather than a binary question of law,1 83 both defense and prosecution should
determine the actions that caused a breach and the evidence showing the nature
of the breach.
To determine whether a defendant has breached a proffer agreement, the
court must first determine whether the defendant's breach was minor or
material.184 "A material breach is one that deprives the non-breaching party of
the benefit of its bargain."'8 5  However, "'if a party's nonperformance . . . is
innocent, does not thwart the purpose of the bargain, and is wholly dwarfed by
that party's performance, the breaching party has substantially performed under
the contract, and the non-breaching party is not entitled to rescission.""1
86
The materiality of a breach is a "question of degree."'8 7 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts lists the following factors to determine whether a breach is
material:
a. the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected;
b. the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be
deprived;
c. the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will suffer forfeiture;
d. the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the
circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
e. the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform
or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and
fair dealing.'ss
The court will apply these factors with the standard of objective
reasonableness, rather than the parties' purely subjective beliefs.189
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (1981).
183. See Young v. McKelvey, 286 S.C. 119, 123, 333 S.E.2d 566, 568 (1985).
184. See 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:3 (4th ed. 2002) (citing
Mgmt. Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 557 N.W.2d 67, 77 (Wis. 1996)).
185. United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 546-47 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1998)).
186. Id. at 547 (alteration in original) (quoting Castaneda, 162 F.3d at 838).
187. LORD, supra note 184.
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
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To prove these factors, ordinarily a great deal of facts will be needed to
address the circumstances and nature of a breach.'90 While the prosecution in
Wills successfully proved breach with only general allegations of deceptiveness,
general contract principles (as well as the dissenting opinion) counsel that
prosecutors likely should show more.191 Instead, the prosecution should not only
have to show that a defendant's deception was material, but that it materially
related to the purpose of the proffer agreement. Although similar, deception
goes to the credibility of the defendant, while relevance goes to whether the
deception harms the purpose of the proffer agreement.
To illustrate material deception, take the earlier example of a defendant
deemed deceptive for stating that a burglary occurred at 12:30, rather than the
real time of 12:45. While the difference in time may technically be a breach, it is
likely not a material breach because such a small discrepancy in time is not
likely to call the truthfulness of the defendant's statement into question.
Additionally, a clause focused on deceptiveness or truthfulness should contain an
implicit requirement of knowledge or intent. If so, the prosecution in this
hypothetical would need to show that the discrepancy in time was also made
intentionally or knowingly.
Similarly, to illustrate material relevance, take the same defendant, who
instead honestly and accurately recites all of the facts and circumstances of the
burglary but lies about an unrelated relationship with a girlfriend. While the
defendant in this example has been materially deceptive, the deception is not
likely materially relevant to the purpose of the proffer agreement. In order to
prove breach, the prosecution should have to show how the lie about the
girlfriend thwarts the purpose of the proffer agreement.
These examples are illustrative of the fact that most proffer agreements defy
general analysis because, in most cases, the facts of each case will ultimately be
determinative. However, polygraph examinations are one exception that requires
greater attention. It is not clear whether a polygraph should be used at all, given
their inadmissibility in a criminal trial.192 The South Carolina Supreme Court
has denied admissibility for polygraph examinations even in limited
circumstances similar to a Denno hearing, such as a bifurcated sentencing
phase.193  While a polygraph was used in Wills, prosecutors should tread
carefully before making a polygraph the sole method of determining breach.
Because polygraphs are otherwise inadmissible in criminal trials, litigation on
their use in proffer agreements may occur in the near future.
Going forward, prosecutors should be careful to limit the scope of proffer
agreements to assure not only that it covers the information they wish to know,
but also that it is sufficiently narrow to prevent a dispute about material
190. See id.
191. See State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 206, 762 S.E.2d 3, 15 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting).
192. See State v. Wright, 322 S.C. 253, 255, 471 S.E.2d 700, 701 (1996) (citing Stave v.
Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 582, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982)).
193. Copeland, 278 S.C. at 582, 300 S.E.2d at 69.
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relevance. Similarly, prosecutors should carefully select a method to determine
breach that will sufficiently show the material deception was made with
knowledge or intent. While a polygraph may be able to satisfy these criteria,
prosecutors should find other grounds than a polygraph to assure that a waiver
will be effective.
For defense attorneys, keeping a polygraph out of the proffer agreement is
critical. Additionally, if the prosecution alleges that a breach has occurred, the
defense should focus on showing that any alleged deception or breach is neither
material nor materially relevant.
D. Remedies for Breach
Of all the controversies in the application of proffer agreements, the remedy
for a breach is the most important issue for prosecution and defense. Though the
use of a total waiver of Rule 410 appears to be a permanent addition to the legal
landscape, the circumstances under which the prosecution should be allowed to
rescind the proffer agreement and when the prosecution should be allowed to
admit proffered testimony as damages for breach should remain controversial.
Though born out of plea agreements, proffer agreements fundamentally
differ in the remedies that most favor prosecutors. In plea agreements, rescission
is likely the prosecution's best remedy.194 Like any breach, rescission requires a
material breach that is "so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the purpose
of the contract."195 Therefore, "a rescission will not be granted for a minor or
casual breach of a contract, but only for those breaches which defeat the object
of the contracting parties.' 96 The purpose of rescission is to restore the parties
to the status quo before the contract was entered.197 As a result, "[r]escission
voids the contract ab initio, meaning that it is considered null from the beginning
and treated as if it does not exist for any purpose."'198
Rescission is the natural choice in plea agreements for numerous reasons.
First, it allows the prosecution to continue prosecuting the defendant.199 Because
194. See generally Annotation, Right of Prosecutor to Withdraw from Plea Bargain Prior to
Entry of Plea, 16 A.L.R. 4th 1089 (1982 & Supp. 2014) (discussing the ability of prosecutors to
withdraw from plea agreements).
195. Rogers v. Salisbury Brick Corp., 299 S.C. 141, 143, 382 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1989) (quoting
Elliott v. Snyder, 246 S.C. 186, 191, 143 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1965)).
196. Brazell v. Windsor, 384 S.C. 512, 517, 682 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2009) (citing Rogers, 299
S.C. at 143-44, 382 S.E.2d at 917).
197.See King v. Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 313, 318 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Hester v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 268 F. Supp. 623, 629 (D.S.C. 1967); Rice & Santos, Inc. v.
Jones, 279 S.C. 201, 204, 305 S.E.2d 74, 76 (1983)).
198. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 584 (2004) (citing First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 827
A.2d 230, 237 (N.J. 2003)); see also State v. Wills, 409 S.C. 183, 199, 762 S.E.2d 3, 11 (2014)
(Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting 17A AM. JUR. 2D, supra) (arguing that the State and the defendant
should be returned to the same position they were in before entering into a proffer agreement).
199.See Reed v. Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 684, 511 S.E.2d 396, 400 (Ct. App. 1999).
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the prosecution cannot require a defendant to plead guilty,200 rescission provides
the best alternative. The same cannot be said for proffer agreements. In a
proffer agreement, the prosecution should never ask for rescission because the
status quo is the protections of Rule 410.201 In a proffer agreement, the starting
point of the parties is no waiver of Rule 410. Thus, a rescission will cancel the
waiver of Rule 410, rather than give it effect.202 Of course, that did not stop the
203prosecution in Wills from attempting to use rescission language.
Rather than return the parties to their initial positions, the prosecution in
Wills attempted instead to partially rescind the contract, enforcing the criminal
204defendant's promise while rescinding its own. Regardless of the prosecution's
205intent, partial rescission is almost universally forbidden. This is because the
"retention of only the benefits amounts to unjust enrichment and binds the
parties to a contract they did not contemplate."206 Therefore, despite the
prosecution's creative wording, the remedy sought was not correctly described,
and was unlawful as a result. Instead, the prosecution should have asked for the
equivalent of liquidated damages.
Liquidated damages are an agreed-upon sum of money to be paid or a
207deposit to be forfeited in the event of a breach of the contract. The amount
should be a good faith estimate and proportionate to the probable loss. 208 If the
209amount exceeds this threshold, it will be an unenforceable penalty. If a
provision is a penalty, the recovery available is not measured by the sum
stipulated, but the actual damages proven to have been sustained by the
breach.210
Viewed in a vacuum, the greatest concern for a prosecutor would be to
assure that total waiver will not be viewed as a penalty clause. However, where
courts have already allowed for total waiver, as South Carolina courts have, this
is not likely to be a concern. Only in a state with a similar adaptation of general
contract principles that has yet to address total waiver of Rule 410 is such an
argument likely to be relevant. Therefore, rather than spending their time
arguing for partial rescission or for the validity of total waiver, prosecutors
should plainly describe the events that will constitute breach and specifically
describe what type of waiver they will seek in that event. The waiver should
avoid the use of the phrase "null and void" or other language typically used for
200. See supra Part III.B.4.
201. See Wills, 409 S.C. at 199, 762 S.E.2d at 11 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 199, 762 S.E.2d at 11.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 533 (2004) (citations omitted).
206. Id. (citing Simmons v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 209 P.2d 581, 587 (Cal. 1949)).
207. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 146 (1935).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Tate v. Le Master, 231 S.C. 429, 442, 99 S.E.2d 39, 46 (1957) (citing 25A C.J.S.
Damages § 198 (2012 & Supp. 2014)).
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rescission. Where prosecutors fail to do so, defense attorneys should
vociferously argue that the words selected by the prosecution require rescission,
rather than activation of the waiver clause.
IV. USE OF MODEL PROFFER AGREEMENT
Ultimately, a well-drafted proffer agreement is a simple document. To be
effective, a proffer agreement needs only a skeleton of provisions to define the
responsibilities of the parties and the possible outcomes for performance and
breach. Though many issues might render a proffer agreement invalid, most can
be prevented by proactive drafting. So long as the prosecution uses restraint and
carefully considers the effect of its provisions, a proffer agreement should
withstand any challenge to its validity. However, where the prosecution fails to
do so, either out of zeal to obtain an advantage in negotiation or negligence in
drafting, provisions may be struck or the entire proffer agreement may be held
invalid. Because a ruling that a proffer agreement is invalid could jeopardize
any chance at a successful prosecution, prosecutors should take care to prioritize
drafting enforceable terms over all other concerns.
With these concerns in mind, this Note proposes a model proffer agreement
that may be used as a basis for future proffer agreements. While the terms of
this model may require alteration or substitution given the requirements of a
case, the structure and language of this model provide a basic structure for future
proffer agreements. Therefore, with the goal of creating a valid and enforceable
agreement, the model proffer agreement appears below.
V. MODEL PROFFER AGREEMENT
[The Defendant] agrees to submit [himself/herself] to agent(s) of the State
for the purpose of debriefing regarding [description of the matter] and all other
matters materially bearing on this matter. [He/she] shall be completely truthful
concerning [his/her] involvement in this matter and completely truthful
concerning the involvement of all other individuals in this matter. [He/she] shall
truthfully and completely answer all questions posed by agent(s) of the State
bearing materially on this matter and shall provide without prompting all
material information concerning this matter in a complete and truthful manner,
even if such information is not elicited by agent(s) of the State by direct
question. Any and all information provided by [name of defendant] under the
terms of this proffer agreement may be recorded in any fashion at the election of
the State.
[The Defendant] agrees that if [he/she] is materially dishonest about any
material issue related to this matter that the Defendant will be in material breach
of this proffer agreement.
If [the Defendant] becomes aware of any material issue relating to the
truthfulness or accuracy of the material portions of [his/her] proffer statement,
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[he/she] must provide a corrected statement to the State within [reasonable
period of time]. Failure to do so shall constitute a material breach of this
agreement.
Any material breach by [the Defendant] shall allow the State to use any
statement made by [the Defendant] in [his/her] proffer for any legal purpose,
including, but not limited to:
a. considerations for charging;
b. bond;
c. disposition of charges through plea or trial of [the Defendant];
d. impeachment of testimony;
e. rebuttal;
f. as a part of the State's case-in-chief-
g. sentencing;
h. post-conviction relief and
i. in any fashion, whether direct or collateral to this matter;
In return for [the Defendant's] full compliance with all terms stated within
this proffer agreement, the State shall allow [the Defendant] to [negotiate for a
plea agreement/State's promise].
[The Defendant] agrees and understands that this proffer agreement shall
constitute a valid and binding agreement between the State and [the Defendant],
effective upon the signing of this document.
[Handwritten clause] By signing this agreement, I, [written name], agree that
I am fully aware the terms of this agreement, having [read it myself/discussed
with my attorney/method of understanding] and knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.
(signature of defendant) (date)
(signature of defense counsel) (date)
(signature of State representative) (date)
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VI. CONCLUSION
Proffer agreements are documents that serve the simple purpose of
encouraging an honest and frank dialogue between criminal defendants and the
prosecution. Despite the simplicity of this purpose, the execution of a proper
and enforceable plea agreement requires thought and care beyond what is often
the norm. In most cases, proffer agreements contain simple and easily
correctible mistakes. Where, however, prosecutors seek to use proffer
agreements as a tool to ease prosecution, the mistakes made may be much more
difficult to unwind and correct. While their motivation is understandable, the
inherent power of the total waiver of Rule 410 should convince prosecutors to
conservatively draft proffer agreements to ensure their enforceability. Where
prosecutors fail to do so, they risk not only the enforceability of a proffer
agreement, but also irreparable damage to the rights of criminal defendants and
the integrity of the criminal justice system. And while Wills represents an
enormous victory for the prosecution, prosecutors should not lose sight of fair
play and seek to serve criminal justice in each step of the prosecution.
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